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Decision-making  within  police  work  is a  global  concern.  Our  research  attempts  to  contribute  to the
literature  regarding  how  police  ofﬁcers  make  decisions.  We  examined  the  interactive  effects  of decision-
making  style  and  anger  control  on  decision-making  using  a sample  of  120  police  ofﬁcers.  Police  ofﬁcers
were  presented  with a realistic  decision-making  scenario,  and  asked  to  choose  their  intended  action.eywords:
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Results  suggest  that  analytical  and  intuitive  cognitive  processes  have  an interactive  effect  on  decision-
making.  Results  are  discussed  regarding  the  implications  on ofﬁcer  decision-making  training.
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nger control
. Introduction
During 2014, at least three incidences of public protests were
eported in the media which occurred as a result of what appeared
o many people as being poor police decision-making. In Ferguson,
issouri, for example, residents demonstrated their dissatisfaction
ith the shooting of Michael Brown with active protest activities
or at least four months. Similar recent incidences in the media have
een observed in Europe and Middle-Eastern countries as well as
ther regions of the world. The issue of how police ofﬁcers make
ecisions is a very important topic and has far-reaching implica-
ions on the public. The recent cases of which the public has been
ighly critical regarding police ofﬁcers’ decisions, highlights a need
or attention to this topic, both by practitioners and researchers.
he judgment and decision-making literature has made notable
rogress toward understanding how decisions are made in high
isk or crisis situations such as those faced by police ofﬁcers. There-
ore, we attempt to explore this domain further by focusing on the
peciﬁc context of police work.
Within the judgment and decision-making literature, the dual
rocess model has been frequently utilized to explain the nature
f the decision-making process. Speciﬁcally, this dichotomy in rea-
oning has been labeled System 1 and System 2. System 1 refers
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 618 560 3719.
E-mail addresses: sbrown82@depaul.edu (S.G. Brown), cdaus@siue.edu
C.S. Daus).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2015.04.001
211-3681/© 2015 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Published by
reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).to thinking characterized by automatic, principally unconscious,
and effortless processing, while System 2 denotes controlled,
largely conscious and effortful processing (Stanovich & West, 2000).
While this dual-system approach has received signiﬁcant attention
among decision-making researchers, some have been critical of its
propositions. For example, Systems 1 and 2 are believed to be insep-
arable – especially in complex decision-making contexts (Keren &
Schul, 2009). In fact, some have proposed a uniﬁed framework with
the suggestion that both Systems 1 and 2 involve similar rule-based
judgments (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). Yet, the approach does
seem to provide a useful classiﬁcation and has signiﬁcant research
support (Evans, 2008; Kruglanski & Orehek, 2007). For example, the
dual-process theory has been applied to probability judgment to
demonstrate that biases, often linked to System 1 processes may  be
ameliorated by System 2 thinking (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005).
Considering the value of the dual-process model to decision-
making, we apply this framework to understand the speciﬁc
decision-making experience of police ofﬁcers. Explicitly, our pri-
mary concern relates to the management of anger and its effects
on decision-making. Police ofﬁcers report that anger, as well as the
control of anger, is a key emotional experience within police work
(Daus & Brown, 2012). Thus, we seek to examine how police ofﬁcers’
inclination toward engaging in intuitive and rational decision-
making and their tendency to control their anger are related to
the decisions that they typically make. Hence, rather than restric-
ting our attention to cognitive processes alone, we also explore
the effect of emotion, which is often linked to System 1 processes
(Epstein, 1994).
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Therefore, the following research seeks, ﬁrst, to understand bet-
er the extent to which the tendency of controlling the expression
f anger inﬂuences decisions to act within the context of police
ork. Additionally, we hope to demonstrate that anger control can
ct as a buffer in situations of impulsive decision-making when an
nger-inducing incident is presented. Second, we explore System
 thinking, which involves intuitive and emotional processes, and
rovides a ﬁtting representation of police work. Given that police
fﬁcers often rely on intuitive reasoning in crisis situations (Patton,
003), our study will help to clarify how such reasoning occurs
hile providing a better understanding of the role of emotions in
olice ofﬁcers’ decision-making. Third, our research provides some
mplications for action avoidance. Within the context of police work
 a high stress profession (Finn & Tomz, 1996) – a tendency toward
voidance may  represent a coping strategy (Anshel, 2000). There-
ore, exploring the processes leading to such decisions (i.e., the
ecision not to use force, for example) may  provide some insight
nto how decision-making processes may  aid the demands of police
ork.
In the following sections we provide a review of the litera-
ure and support for our hypotheses. First, we discuss the role of
motions in the decision-making process with a speciﬁc focus on
nger. Next, we introduce the decision-making styles and provide
n overview of the intuitive and rational styles. In this discussion,
e propose a mapping of these two decision-making styles onto
he dual-process framework with intuitive decision-making style
eing more typical of System 1 processes, and rational decision-
aking being more typical of System 2 processes. Additionally, in
ur study, we examined the effects of decision-making style and
nger control on reported decisions to either discharge a weapon
r issue a speeding ticket (details to follow); we refer to decisions
n favor of these options as action.
.1. Emotions in decision-making
Attention to the consideration of the role of emotions in the
ual process account of decision-making has been called for by
esearchers (e.g., Evans, 2008). Emotions are linked to System 1,
r experiential processes, with reasoning being categorical, unre-
ective and action-oriented. Further, thinking is believed to be
ore self-evidently valid when individuals are highly emotional
Epstein, 1994). That is, when emotions are strongly felt, individuals
re more likely to engage in actions based on broad generalizations
nd have greater trust in the legitimacy of these actions. Therefore,
motions may  play an important role in judgment and decision-
aking processes. While emotions are more closely tied to the
xperiential system, they are not considered to be the foundation of
he system’s decision-making processes. Rather, emotions function
o support the acquisition of information to aid decision-making
Epstein, 1994). In novel situations, emotions are relied on signiﬁ-
antly for their informational role, and as behavior becomes more
roceduralized and thus automatic, emotions are less required
Smith, 1984). This distinction is relevant to police decision-making
iven the situations within which police ofﬁcers make decisions.
hile the need to decide to use some form of force is commonplace,
he actual deployment of force is quite rare. For example, the use of
 gun as a weapon across six different jurisdictions has a frequency
f only 0.1% during arrest situations (Garner & Maxwell, 1999). This
mplies that decision-making in such high risk circumstances may
ot have the opportunity of becoming proceduralized for police
fﬁcers, which may  suggest greater reliance on the informational
upport of emotions in these decision-making processes.This inﬂuence on the decision-making process reﬂects the idea
hat in many cases, decisions are guided by factors that depart from
he traditional ‘rational path’ expected of the decision-making pro-
ess (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). In fact, others propose that thein Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 294–302 295
departure from classical rationality, such as the use of fast-and-
frugal algorithms, is superior to previously held rational norms
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Emotions may  play a similar role
as these alternatives to controlled and calculated thinking (Epstein,
1994; Evans, 2008). We  believe that the emotion of anger will have
an effect on the decision-making process as police ofﬁcers make an
active effort to control this emotion.
1.2. Anger and decision-making
Affect (i.e., emotions and mood), impacts decision-making by
guiding what decision-makers think (i.e., the content), as well as
how they think (i.e., the process; Forgas & George, 2001). In this
study, we focused on the emotion of anger – speciﬁcally, its regula-
tion or control. This provides implications regarding the experience
of anger – absence of regulation – and the suppression of anger –
result of successful regulation. That is, on one hand, we  believe
that when expressed, anger may  affect police decisions by means
of the information the emotion contributes to the evaluation of
alternatives. On the other hand, when anger is being controlled,
this functions against the automatic response inherent in System 1
thinking. Given that both the expression and suppression of anger
occur frequently in police work (Daus & Brown, 2012), it is valuable
to consider how this emotion impacts decision-making.
Anger, a negative affective experience, has unique effects on
cognitive processes such as judgment when compared to posi-
tive or other negative affective states. Anger may  trigger intuitive
processes and, relatedly, increase the desire to reach a decision
(Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005). Often, harmful situations elicit anger
and require quick and adaptive responses (Bodenhausen, Sheppard,
& Kramer 1994) which occur by means of System 1 or more intu-
itive processes. This suggests that the experience of anger should
strengthen the effect of intuitive thinking on decision-making,
while the control of anger should act as a conﬂicting force.
1.3. Anger control
The control of anger, a form of emotional coping, requires the
reappraisal of an otherwise stressful emotional event to reduce
experienced distress (Lazarus, 1993). Anger control is also a form
of emotion regulation that involves the modiﬁcation of the experi-
ence and expression of an emotional response (Gross & John, 2003).
Emotion regulation has been conceptualized within a dual-process
framework. Speciﬁcally, it has been proposed that emotion reg-
ulation can be conceived either as deliberate, response-focused
regulation (explicit regulation; Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011; for
example, see Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman 2004)
or automatic, largely unconscious regulatory processes (implicit
regulation; Gyurak et al., 2011; for example, see Gollwitzer, 1999).
Particularly, the control of anger has been suggested to involve
some automatic control (Mauss, Cook, & Gross, 2007); however,
evidence also suggests that the control of anger involves some con-
scious regulation (Martin & Dahlen, 2005), signifying that rational
processes are involved in its execution. Since a part of the con-
trol of anger is a rational process, this leads us to expect that
there will be a positive relationship between anger-control and the
rational decision-making style (Hypothesis 1a) and a negative rela-
tionship between anger-control and the intuitive decision-making
style (Hypothesis 1b). Further, it could be expected that when the
anger control tendency is high, police ofﬁcers will exercise more
cognitive control and be less likely to make an impulsive decision
toward acting. Therefore, we  hypothesize that anger control will be
negatively related with action such that the more likely one is to
control one’s anger, the less likely one would be to report that s/he
would issue a ticket or shoot (Hypothesis 2).
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cers were employed by a police department located in an urban
area in Jamaica. Table 1 provides a summary of the sample demo-
graphics. Ofﬁcers were recruited by initiation of their respective96 S.G. Brown, C.S. Daus / Journal of Applied Res
.4. Decision-making styles
Besides the effect of emotional factors on decision-making,
ndividual differences can also have an effect. Previous research
as examined decision-making from a situational perspective –
peciﬁc contexts of the decision – but often without much consider-
tion of potential individual differences in decision styles and their
nﬂuence in the process (e.g. Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).
ttention has been directed toward the inﬂuence of decision-
aking styles which are deﬁned as “learned, habitual response
atterns exhibited by an individual when confronted with a
ecision-making situation” (Scott & Bruce, 1995, p. 820).
Five decision-making styles have been empirically identiﬁed
ncluding: rational (thorough search and logical evaluation); intu-
tive (reliance on hunches); dependent (seeking advice); avoidant
tendency to delay); and spontaneous (immediacy) (Gambetti,
abbri, Bensi, & Tonetti, 2008; Scott & Bruce, 1995). An individual’s
enchant for each style varies from high to low and decision-
aking may  be guided by multiple styles; yet, for each person,
ne style tends to be predominant. The present research focuses on
he rational and intuitive styles as these are most relevant to our
ypotheses, and are primarily implicated in the risky and sponta-
eous decisions of police ofﬁcers, as roughly representing ‘opposite
nds of the spectrum’ in terms of approach to the problem. As such,
e anticipate that the intuitive and rational decision-making styles
ill be negatively correlated, as observed in previous research
r = −.19 to −.25; Scott & Bruce, 1995). Therefore, we  expect that
here will be a negative relationship between the intuitive and
ational decision-making styles (Hypothesis 3).
.5. Intuitive decision-making
Intuitive decision-making refers to the process of deciding with
 reliance on the use of feelings, hunches, and correlates with
 spontaneous approach to decision-making (r = .32–.53; Scott &
ruce, 1995). This approach to making decisions may  develop
ver time. That is, intuitive reasoning develops through instinc-
ive response, general experience and focused learning (Patton,
003). Practically, this is useful for the nature of police work and
specially so in crisis situations demanding immediate response.
iven the impulsive nature of acting on hunches, we  expect that
olice ofﬁcers will be more likely to decide to act when they
ave a tendency toward using an intuitive decision-making style.
herefore, we expect a positive relationship between intuitive
ecision-making style and action such that the higher one scores
n intuitive decision-making style, the more likely one would be to
ssue a ticket or shoot (Hypothesis 4a).
The above, however, raises some questions regarding the expe-
ience of those with a propensity toward intuitive thinking, and
specially in the midst of an anger-inducing event. Given that
hose with a high intuitive style should be more likely to make
pontaneous decisions, when faced with a situation requiring an
mmediate response such as discharging a weapon in a threaten-
ng situation or having to make a decision about issuing a speeding
icket, it is expected that the default response will be the more
mpulsive response of immediate action. However, when anger
ontrol propensity is high, ofﬁcers may  demonstrate a different
esponse to the opposing forces of impulsivity versus control.
hat is, police ofﬁcers may  be largely inclined to rely on System
 processes (i.e., experiential or automatic) given their experi-
nce and training (Patton, 2003); however, given the System 2
i.e., controlled or conscious) demands of anger control (Martin Dahlen, 2005), ofﬁcers may  respond using more controlled
ecision-making – represented as less of a likelihood to issue a
icket or use deadly force. As such, we expect that anger control will
oderate the effect of intuitive decision-making style on actionin Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 294–302
such that there will be a negative relationship between intuitive
decision style and action for participants high on anger control and
a positive relationship for those low on anger control (Hypothesis
5a).
1.6. Rational decision-making
Rational decision-making refers to the process of making logical
evaluations of alternatives, engaging in thorough search strate-
gies, and is negatively correlated with a spontaneous approach to
decision-making (r = −.29 to −.41; Scott & Bruce, 1995). In other
words, rational decision-making style is an analytical and slower-
evolving process in comparison to intuitive decision-making style.
As a note, we understand that the term ‘rational’ can be perceived
contrarily. In this paper, our reference to a “rational decision-
making style” refers to the decision process and not the decision
outcome. To illustrate,1 imagine two  groups of 1000 ofﬁcers each.
The 1000 ofﬁcers of the ﬁrst group rely on their hunches and are
fast thinking. The other 1000 ofﬁcers carefully weigh the various
alternatives and are slower thinking – representatives of System 1
and System 2. Now, imagine all 2000 operate in a highly risky envi-
ronment. After 10 years, 10 of the ﬁrst group (intuitive), but 30 of
the second group (rational) have been killed in their job. Thinking of
rationality as an outcome would imply that those in the ﬁrst group
are more rational as they show higher survival probabilities. How-
ever, in classifying rational decision-making style, we merely aim to
be consistent with the label used by other decision-making authors
(e.g., Scott & Bruce, 1995) who  allude to the rational styles being
an analytical approach to making decisions, and not the resultant
outcomes of those decisions.
That said, we suggest that the rational decision-making style
will have the opposite effect on decisions in comparison to the
intuitive style. Speciﬁcally, rather than responding impulsively by
acting, ofﬁcers will be more likely to avoid issuing a ticket or dis-
charging their weapon when high on rational decision-making
style. Speciﬁcally, we hypothesize that rational decision-making
style will be negatively related to action such that the higher one
scores on rational decision-making style, the less likely one would
be to issue a ticket or shoot (Hypothesis 4b). Further, rational
decision-making style which involves some System 2 processes,
should demonstrate an interaction with anger-control which has
also been suggested to involve some analytical processes (Martin &
Dahlen, 2005). Speciﬁcally, anger control will moderate the effect
of rational decision-making style on action such that there will be a
negative relationship between rational decision style and action for
participants high on anger control, and a positive relationship for
those low on anger control (Hypothesis 5b). See Fig. 1 for a summary
of the study hypotheses.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Participants (N = 120) were law enforcement ofﬁcers from
Jamaica and Midwestern U.S. Of the U.S. sample, 27 ofﬁcers were
employed at three police departments within suburban commu-
nities, and 44 ofﬁcers worked in police departments operating in
more inner-city settings in the Midwest. The remaining 49 ofﬁ-chief (through both email and face-to-face meeting such as shift
1 We thank Ulrich Hoffrage for this example.
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SFig. 1. Graphical summary of the independent variables, the dep
rieﬁngs). Participation was voluntary. Participants were ensured
hat their responses would be anonymous, and that their partici-
ation or responses would in no way affect their employment.
.2. Procedure
Data were collected in-person by the ﬁrst author at the local
recincts in the U.S. and by the police chief in Jamaica. Participants
ere asked to complete a series of questionnaires. Firstly, par-
icipants completed the General Decision-Making Style Inventory
GDMS) (Scott & Bruce, 1995). Only scores on the rational and intu-
tive decision-making styles were used for this study. Participants
ere also asked to complete a demographic measure.
Secondly, ofﬁcers were randomly assigned to one of two
ecision-making scenarios (between-subjects design) and asked
o make a decision based on the information presented. The two
cenarios differed in outcome severity: one required a decision to
hoot or not shoot, and the other required a decision to issue or not
ssue a speeding ticket. The scenario requiring a decision of shoot-
ng or not was in the form of a domestic violence altercation with
ptions based on the continuum of force (Terril, 2001). The ﬁnal
nd most severe option was to shoot. Finally, to explore the type
f anger control tendencies of the police ofﬁcers, anger control was
lso measured.
able 1
ample demographics.
Demographic Overall United States Jamaica
Age (years) 35.52 (8.21) 37.15 (7.81) 32.84 (8.24)
Gender
Male 80% 93% 70%
Female 16% 7% 30%
Race
Caucasian 60% 97% 0%
Black 39% 1% 100%
Hispanic 1% 1% 0%
Experience (years) 10.70 (8.06) 11.50 (8.30) 9.36 (7.58)
Hours worked per week 42.80 (11.40) 40.74 (2.36) 46.40 (18.23)t variable, and the hypotheses. Note: “H” denotes “Hypothesis”.
2.3. Decision scenario
The scenario methodology was selected to assist with stan-
dardizing the context of the decisions across participants. This
method has been recommended as a useful technique for making
the stimulus situation more real and consistent across participants
(Alexander & Becker, 1978). Hypothetical vignettes or scenarios
are a common research tool used in ethical decision-making (e.g.,
Fritzsche, 2000; O’Fallon & Butterﬁeld, 2005), decision-making
under risk (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and medical decision-
making (e.g., McKinlay, Potter, & Feldman, 1996). Given that our
sample included actual police ofﬁcers (with an average of 10 years’
experience) we  felt that the hypothetical nature of the scenario-
based method would not signiﬁcantly affect the quality of our data.
That is, experts often provide more valid data as they engage in
more concrete reasoning than novices and are more mindful of
contextual uncertainties (Calderwood, Crandall, & Klein, 1987).
As mentioned, two  versions of a decision-making scenario were
developed with input from a subject matter expert (a Police Chief
from a Midwestern town), and used as the decision-making task.
Each scenario presented a situation similar to what a police ofﬁ-
cer may  encounter on the job, and then asked the ofﬁcers to select
a course of action they would choose. The two  scenarios are pre-
sented in Appendix A and varied according to the severity of the
outcome associated with the decision, allowing us to test our
hypotheses across a high and low stakes situation. The ﬁrst sce-
nario represented responding to a domestic violence call where
an individual becomes aggressive toward the ofﬁce, and required
the ofﬁcer to indicate his/her response on a 10 point scale with
response options based on the continuum of force (Terril, 2001).
The second scenario was  a realistic trafﬁc violation situation, which
required a decision by an ofﬁcer either to issue a ticket or not.
2.4. Measures2.4.1. Demographic measure
Participants completed a questionnaire to assess demographics.
This measure included age, race, gender, job role, hours worked per
week and years of experience within law enforcement.
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Table  2
Correlational analyses.
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4
1. Rational decison-making stylea 4.31 .61 –
2.  Intuitive decision-making stylea 3.27 .66 .04 –
3.  Anger controla 3.23 .51 .22* .13 –
4.  Actionb .50 .50 −.21* .13 −.05 –
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t* p < .05.
a Coded on a 5-point Likert stype scale with 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly a
b Coded such that 0 = avoid and 1 = not avoid (action).
.4.2. Anger control
Two dimensions of anger control were measured using anger
ontrol subscales: Anger-Control In (AX/Con-In),  ˛ = .87; and
nger-Control Out (AX/Con-Out),  ˛ = .90 from the State-Trait Anger
cale (STAS) (Spielberger, Krasner, & Solomon, 1988). The subscales
ere highly correlated (r = .66), and combined for an aggregate
easure of anger control (  ˛ = .93).
.4.3. Decision-making style
Decision-making style was captured using the rational and intu-
tive subscales of the General Decision-Making Style Inventory
GDMS) (Scott & Bruce, 1995). The GDMS is a 24-item question-
aire, which measures individual decision-making styles using a
-point rating scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).
ample items (Scott & Bruce, 1995, p. 825–826) include, “I make
ecisions in a logical and systematic way” (rational); and “When
 make decisions, I tend to rely on my  intuition” (intuitive). Cron-
ach’s alphas for the rational and intuitive subscales were .86 and
67, respectively.
.4.4. Dependent variable-action
The dependent variable was operationalized as the ofﬁcers’
ntended action to the decision scenario. Decisions of issuing a
icket and shooting were coded as ‘action’ for analysis purposes,
hus making the dependent variable a similar dichotomous variable
or both scenarios. Action was coded such that 0 = avoid, and 1 = not
void (i.e., shoot or issue ticket). For the ticket scenario, the decision
ot to issue a ticket was considered avoidance. For the domestic
iolence scenario, options 1 through 9 on the use of force con-
inuum were considered avoidance. These decision options were
ollapsed and coded as ‘0′, while the shoot option was  coded as ‘1′.
he domestic violence variable was dichotomized due to limited
ariance. Speciﬁcally, in response to the domestic violence scenario,
nly 19% (n = 11) of the ofﬁcers chose an option less than 9 (e.g., the
se of non-lethal force).
. Results
.1. Common method variance
Due to the self-report nature of our measures, we addressed
oncerns of common method variance by applying statistical guide-
ines presented in the literature. We  used Harman’s single-factor
est to determine if common method variance was  a signiﬁcant
oncern in our data. This method is widely used in behavioral
esearch and involves conducting an exploratory factor analysis
nd assessing the unrotated matrix to determine if a general fac-
or explains a majority of the variance in the variables (Podsakoff,
acKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). A general factor accounting
or most of the variance would suggest a source of bias driving
he results. A principal component analysis was conducted on the
ational and intuitive decision-making styles and anger control. The
umber of factors was constrained to 1 to examine the amount of
ariance explained by a general factor. The unrotated factor solu-
ion revealed that 42% of the variance was explained by this generalfactor (eigenvalue = 1.27). This suggests that common method bias
was not a concern in this study as another 58% of the variance was
unaccounted for by this general factor.
3.2. Hypotheses
Correlational and regression analyses were conducted to test
the study hypotheses. Table 2 presents the correlations between
study variables, which were used to test Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2,
3. Table 3 presents logistic regression results for Hypotheses 4a,
4b, 5a & 5b. Hypothesis 1a suggested a positive relationship
between anger-control and rational decision-making style. In sup-
port of the hypothesis the data analysis indicated that those with
more anger-control were also more likely to endorse a rational
decision-making style. Hypothesis 1b proposed a negative relation-
ship between intuitive decision-making style and anger control,
and was not supported. Hypothesis 2 proposed a negative rela-
tionship between anger control and anger; the hypothesis was
not supported. Hypothesis 3 proposed a negative relationship
between intuitive and rational decision-making; the hypothesis
was not supported as the styles were not signiﬁcantly correlated.
Hypothesis 4a, which suggested a positive relationship between
intuitive decision-making style and action was not supported.
Finally, Hypothesis 4b, which suggested a negative relationship
between rational decision-making style and action, was  supported.
Speciﬁcally, for every unit increase in rational decision-making
style the ofﬁcer was .45 times more likely to issue a ticket or choose
lethal force. The data indicate that those with a rational decision-
making style were more likely to respond in a controlled manner.
Binary logistic regression was used to test the extent to which
anger control moderated the relationships between the decision-
making styles and action (Hypotheses 5a & 5b). First, independent
variables were centered to enhance interpretability and reduce
non-essential multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991). Interaction
terms were created between the pair of the IVs (intuitive decision-
making style X anger control and rational decision-making style
X anger control). Each IV was  ﬁrst entered in Step 1 of the
model followed by the interaction term in Step 2. Results revealed
a marginally signiﬁcant interaction (p = .06) between intuitive
decision-making style and anger control in predicting avoidant
behavior (see Table 3). Speciﬁcally, for every unit increase in the
interaction term (i.e., intuitive decision-making style X anger con-
trol), the ofﬁcer was  almost 4 times more likely to issue a ticket or
choose lethal force. The data indicate that when intuitive decision-
making style and anger control are both high, ofﬁcers are more
likely to be impulsive; however, as indicated by Fig. 2, this like-
lihood reduces when high intuition is coupled with high anger
control. Our results show partial support for Hypothesis 5a, while
Hypothesis 5b was  not supported (see Fig. 2).
3.3. Exploratory analysesFinally, although we did not make a speciﬁc prediction, we
examined the extent to which the relationship observed regarding
the interaction between decision-making style and anger control
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Table  3
Regresssion analyses.
Predictor variable B SE Exp (B) p R2 95% CI
Hypothesis 5a .05
Constant −.05 .20 .95 .80
Intuitive decision-making Style .30 .31 1.35 .34 (.73, 2.49)
Anger control −.31 .39 .74 .44 (.34, 1.60)
Intuitive × anger control 1.37 .74 3.94 .06 (.93, 16.69)
Hypothesis 5b .05
Constant .01 .20 1.01 .97
Rational decision-making style −.81 .40 .45 .04 (.20, .98)
Anger control .01 .40 1.01 .97 (.47, 2.20)
Rational × anger control .40 .66 1.49 .55 (.41, 5.44)
Exploratory analysis
Domestic violence scenario .14
Constant −1.52 .40 .22 .00
Intuitive decision-making .74 .54 2.10 .17 (.73, 6.06)
Anger control −1.90 1.08 .15 .08 (.02, 1.24)
Intuitive × anger control 3.53 1.64 34.04 .03 (1.36, 851.48)
Ticket  Scenario .06
Constant 1.27 .34 3.54 .00
Intuitive Decision-making .40 .55 1.50 .47 (.51, 4.42)
Anger control .54 .59 1.72 .36 (.54, 5.43)
Intuitive × anger control 1.85 1.21 6.39 .13 (.60, 68.47)
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nd decision varied as a function of the severity of the consequences
ssociated with the situation (i.e., high or low stakes). We  ran two
eparate logistic regressions for the two decision scenarios. Results
re presented in Table 3 and indicate that anger control signiﬁ-
antly interacted with intuitive decision-making style to inﬂuence
he decision to shoot, but not the decision to issue a ticket. Specif-
cally, for every unit increase in the interaction term (i.e., intuitive
ecision-making style X anger control), the ofﬁcer was  almost 34
imes more likely to choose lethal force. This suggests that when
oth intuitive decision-making and anger control are high, ofﬁcers
re more likely to report they would shoot; however, as indicated in
ig. 3, this likelihood is reduced when intuitive decision-making is
ow, and especially so when this is coupled with high anger control.
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4. Discussion
The purpose of this study was to explore the effects of rational
and intuitive decision-making styles and the control of anger on
decision-making among police ofﬁcers. It was expected that police
ofﬁcers’ scores on intuitive and rational decision-making styles
would be negatively correlated and would have opposite effects
on decisions to act. That is, intuitive decision-making style was
expected to be related to decisions to issue a ticket or shoot while
rational decision-making style was expected to be related to deci-
sions to avoid those choices. Also, anger control was expected to be
negatively related to action and to interact with decision-making
styles to inﬂuence decisions to act.
noitiutnI  High
AngerControl  High
itive decision-making-style and the likelihood of issuing a ticket or shooting. Note:
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As expected, the control of anger was related to rational
ecision-making style. This provides support for previous ﬁndings
f anger control having a rational component as the control of
nger involves conscious emotional regulation (Martin & Dahlen,
005). As well, high intuitive decision-making style had a stronger
elationship with action when police ofﬁcers felt a stronger propen-
ity to control their anger. This was especially true when ofﬁcers
ere faced with a high stake decision (i.e. discharge a weapon).
his suggests a complementary relationship between Systems 1
nd 2 in the decision-making process and speciﬁcally in situa-
ions of severe consequences. The notion of System 1 and System
 working in parallel and being interactive is not a new sugges-
ion; however, System 1 often overrides more rational processes
ausing actions against more effective judgment (Epstein, 1998).
his ﬁnding sheds some light on the value of intuitive reasoning
n conjunction with the control of anger in police decision-
aking. While our study does not address the quality of police
ecisions, it does suggest that intuition has some potential to
nﬂuence decision-makers with a tendency toward heightened felt
nger.
Our initial ﬁndings only suggest marginal support for Hypothe-
is 5a; however; while not predicted, we found stronger support
or the moderated relationship in the situation of more grave
otential of consequence (i.e. discharging a weapon). The inter-
ction between anger control and high intuition had more of
n impact on changing decisions to shoot than issuing a speed-
ng ticket. Arguably, the cognitive demands of a shoot decision
equire more complex thinking than those of a speeding ticket
ecision. Explicitly, this cognitive demand may  be driven by
he fact that police ofﬁcers require evidence of probable cause
hen making decisions (Jacobs, 2013). A situation requiring a
hoot decision may  place more dependence on the inﬂuence of
ontrolled processes to identify probable cause; these processes
ay  overlap with cognitive efforts required to regulate or sup-
ress the expression of anger. The observation of high intuitive
ecision-making style playing a more salient role in more complex
ituations further supports the value of intuition in organiza-
ions and in police work speciﬁcally. This appears to support the
otion that intuition “ironically incorporates analytical processes
hile functioning in contrast to them” (Baylor, 1997, p. 189), asuitive decision-making-style and decisions to shoot. Note: Error bars denote SD.
a more complex situation may  require more systematic think-
ing.
Future research may  explore the interaction between both sys-
tems as well as compare their role in effective decision-making in
police work and other high impact applied settings. A better under-
standing of the quality of decisions made under intuitive processes
in police work is warranted both for selection and training pur-
poses. Further, while previous evidence and arguments suggest a
negative correlation between intuitive and analytical cognitive pro-
cesses (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2003; Scott & Bruce, 1995) –
support of the unitary structure – our ﬁndings, in contrary, sup-
port the dual process framework. Speciﬁcally, the absence of a
signiﬁcant and negative correlation between intuitive and rational-
decision making styles suggests that the two  styles may  in fact be
orthogonal in certain contexts. Future research exploring the fac-
tors inﬂuencing the varying patterns of the relationship between
the two cognitive patterns is warranted.
Also, while our study provided an avenue for understanding the
role of intuitive decision-making style in police work, we acknowl-
edge limitations related to our data being solely self-reported.
Future research may  also seek to replicate our study using actual
performance data from police departments. Second, given our small
sample size, we  were not able to conduct more robust analyses
such as a conﬁrmatory factor analysis to assess potential measure-
ment issues, and multi-group analyses by country and scenario.
Such analyses would have allowed us to assess additional inter-
active effects which we  believe would add further value to the
literature. Speciﬁcally, the ability to analyze the data by country
would have allowed us to assess the effects of cultural values on
decision-making across countries. The U.S and Jamaica demon-
strate some cultural value differences, especially on the dimension
of collectivism/individualism (Hofstede, 1984). An assessment of
the inﬂuence of a collectivistic versus individualistic orientation
in values on police decision-making would have contributed new
insights for future research. Third, given our use of hypothetical
scenarios, caution should be taken when generalizing our ﬁndings.
While the scenario methodology is widely used in the decision-
making literature (e.g., O’Fallon & Butterﬁeld, 2005), it still only
presents participants with ﬁctitious contexts and behavior may,
in fact, vary in real life. Especially, given the high stake nature of
earch 
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he domestic violence situation, police ofﬁcers may  respond dif-
erently based on training, norms and other motivational factors.
ourth, having to collapse our dependent variable to two  dichoto-
ous options was less than ideal. Theoretically, this restricted the
omestic violence options to be on ‘equal value’ with the shoot
ption. This presents some concerns about the forced equivalence
f not shooting and not issuing a speeding ticket. That is, issuing a
peeding ticket has far less severe consequences than shooting an
ttacker in a domestic violence situation. Additionally, the options
ollapsed to represent ‘avoidance’ in the domestic violence situa-
ion speciﬁcally represent the avoidance of shooting rather than an
voidance of action generally.
.1. Practical applications
Practically, we believe this study adds value to police selec-
ion and decision-making training. The use of intuition, as
uggested, is both probable and valuable in police work. In sit-
ations regarding immediate response, police ofﬁcers may  rely
argely on “fast thinking” strategies for reasons related to defense
s well as feasibility. Designing and developing training tar-
eted at allowing ofﬁcers to apply intuition more effectively
ay  reduce the stress associated with decision-making, and
ncrease effectiveness. Furthermore, training targeted at effec-
ive emotional regulation, such as the control of anger, may  also
e useful. This may  be especially relevant in high risk situa-
ions.
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ppendix A. Study vignettes
Ticket scenario:  You are conducting a routine trafﬁc oper-
ation on a Thursday afternoon when your speedometer
identiﬁes the ﬁrst speeding driver for the afternoon. You decide
to follow the driver who continues in excess of 20 miles over
the posted speed limit for 3 blocks. The operator of the vehicle
ignores your repeated efforts to effect the trafﬁc stop, contin-
uing to drive, ignoring your instructions. It appears the driver
is attempting to elude. After one minute of continuous driv-
ing, the driver pulls over and you are not very happy with the
length of time it took for this person to respond to your siren.
You step out of your vehicle and walk toward the driver’s side
of the vehicle with ticket pad in hand. You are certain this per-
son deserves a ticket and are annoyed by their lack of concern
and respect for the law. As soon as you stop by the door, the
window rolls down.
You see a crying middle-aged lady who frantically shakes her
head and begins speaking, “Good afternoon sir, I. . .”  You
stop her mid-sentence, “Are you okay, ma’am?” She begins
explaining that she did not notice she had been speeding until
she noticed your siren. You are faced with the decision of giving
this lady a ticket.in Memory and Cognition 4 (2015) 294–302 301
Domestic violence scenario:  You are traveling south on
Washington Avenue, when you are radioed to a domestic vio-
lence incident involving a male and female at 345 Cornell
Street. While on route to the call, dispatch informs you that
two other ofﬁcers were already at scene engaged in a ﬁght
with the male. You later arrive at the scene and rush to assist
the two other ofﬁcers when you are approached by an angry
female. Without any warning the female takes a swipe at you
with a broken bottle. You tell her to drop the bottle but she
refuses, and continues to advance toward you.
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